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Survey will be of assistance to the practicing bar.
ARTICLE 9-CLASS ACTIONS

CPLR 901: Fraud actions not generically unsuitable for class
certification
Among the prerequisites to a class action1 set forth in CPLR
901 is the requirement that "questions of law or fact common to
the class . . . predominate over any questions affecting only individual members."'2 Since individual reliance upon a material mis1 The procedural rules governing class actions in New York are contained in article 9 of
the CPLR, which repealed and superseded CPLR 1005. See ch. 207, § 2, [1975] N.Y. Laws
316 (McKinney). Under CPLR 1005, one or more persons could maintain a class action
where there was a "question of law or fact common to persons of a numerous class whose
joinder was impracticable." Ch. 308, § 1005, [1962] N.Y. Laws 1332. Under this section,
"[n]either the procedural needs of the members of the class nor the inconvenience to the
courts where many separate suits are combined were, alone, sufficient bases for a class action." 2 WK&M T 901.02, at 9-6. In addition, the courts appeared to require some connection "between the substantive rights of members of the class." Id.; see, e.g., Bouton v. Van
Buren, 229 N.Y. 17, 22, 127 N.E. 477, 478 (1920). Specifically, under CPLR 1005, the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate some "privity" among the members of the class apart
from their separate transactions with the defendant. See Onofrio v. Playboy Club, Inc., 15
N.Y.2d 740, 741, 205 N.E.2d 308, 309, 257 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (1965) (adopting the opinion of
the dissent below, 20 App. Div. 2d 3, 7, 244 N.Y.S.2d 485, 489 (1st Dep't 1963) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)); Brenner v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 236, 11 N.E.2d 890, 893
(1937); cf. Hall v. Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 400, 259 N.E.2d 720, 721, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281,
282 (1970) (similarity in form of contract insufficient basis for class certification); Society
Milion Athena, Inc. v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 292, 22 N.E.2d 374, 377
(1939) (common injury pursuant to a single plan by defendant insufficient basis for class
certification). But see Ray v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 35 N.Y.2d 147, 154, 316
N.E.2d 320, 324, 359 N.Y.S.2d 28, 33 (1974); Richards v. Kaskel, 32 N.Y.2d 524, 536, 300
N.E.2d 388, 393, 347 N.Y.S.2d 1, 8 (1973); Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 535,
223 N.E.2d 869, 872-73, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377, 382-83 (1966). See generally Dole, Consumer
Class Action Under Recent Consumer Credit Legislation, 44 N.Y.U.L. R.v. 80, 104-07
(1969).
2 CPLR 901(a) (1976) provides:
a. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all if:
1. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members, whether otherwise required or permitted, is impracticable;
2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class which predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members;
3. the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class;
4. the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class; and
5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.
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representation is an essential element of a cause of action for
fraud,3 it has been unclear whether fraud cases are suitable for
class action treatment under article 9." Recently, however, in King
The procedure for determining whether the plaintiff's claim is suitable for class action
treatment is set forth in CPLR 902. See CPLR 902 & commentary at 336-37 (1976). In
particular, section 902 mandates that a "mini-hearing" be held; the court's power to grant
class certification is discretionary, however, notwithstanding literal compliance with the requirements of CPLR 901. CPLR 902, commentary at 336-37 (1976). The factors the court
will consider in determining whether class status will be granted include:
1. The interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
2. The impracticability or inefficiency of prosecuting or defending separate
actions;
3. The extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class;
4. The desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claim
in the particular forum; and
5. The difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
CPLR 902 (1976).
3 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 105 (4th ed. 1971). The elements of the offense of common-law fraud are: (1) a representation of a material fact which is false, and known to be
false when made, (2) an intent on the part of the party making the representation to deceive
another, for the purpose of inducing the other to act or refrain from acting, (3) reliance on
the representation by the party to whom it is made, and (4) damages arising from that
reliance. Id.; see Lee v. Wiegand, 28 App. Div. 2d 560, 561, 280 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279 (2d Dep't
1967); Allied Financial Corp. v. Duo Factors, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 538, 539, 271 N.Y.S.2d
402, 403 (1st Dep't 1966), ajf'd, 19 N.Y.2d 865, 227 N.E.2d 591, 280 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1967);
Leventhal v. Martin, 25 App. Div. 2d 508, 508, 266 N.Y.S.2d 774, 775 (1st Dep't 1966).
4 See, e.g., Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc., 60 App. Div. 2d 501, 506, 401 N.Y.S.2d
233, 235 (2d Dep't 1978). Traditionally under CPLR 1005, the statute governing class actions in New York prior to the enactment of CPLR article 9, class certification required
privity among members of the class, see note 1 supra. Therefore, class certification typically
was denied in fraud cases, on the ground that each party had a separate cause of action and
a separate choice of remedies, see Society Milion Athena, Inc. v. National Bank, 281 N.Y.
282, 292, 22 N.E.2d 374, 377 (1939); Brenner v. Title Guar. & Trust Co, 276 N.Y. 230, 233,
11 N.E.2d 890, 891 (1937), or that the defendant would be unable to prepare an adequate
defense when each plaintiff's injury was based on a separate transaction involving different
misrepresentations. See id. at 238, 11 N.E.2d at 893-94; MFT Inv. Co. v. Diversified Data
Servs. and Sciences, Inc., 52 App. Div. 2d 761, 761, 382 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (1st Dep't 1976);
Ballen v. Anne Storch Int'l Asti Tours, Inc., 46 App. Div. 2d 643, 643, 360 N.Y.S.2d 436, 437
(1st Dep't 1974); Bennett v. Strow, 28 Misc. 2d 914, 915, 220 N.Y.S.2d 806, 808 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1961).
CPLR 901 was intended to remove the "privity" requirement in order to provide a
"flexible functional scheme" for class action certification. See note 27 infra. Nevertheless,
courts have been reluctant to certify fraud actions under article 9. See, e.g., Ross v. Amrep
Corp., 57 App. Div. 2d 99, 105, 393 N.Y.S.2d 410, 414 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 42
N.Y.2d 856, 366 N.E.2d 291, 397 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1977); Cornell Univ. v. Dickerson, 100 Misc.
2d 198, 204, 418 N.Y.S.2d 977, 980 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1979). The leading case
granting class status under CPLR 901 in a fraud action is Guadagno v. Diamond Tours &
Travel, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d 697, 392 N.Y.S.2d 783 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1976). In
Guadagno, the plaintiffs sought to represent as a class the members of a charter tour vaca-
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v. Club Med, Inc.,6 the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed a grant of class certification in a fraud action, holding that
the common issues of law and fact in the claim of fraudulent material misrepresentation predominated over the individual questions
of reliance.6
In King, the plaintiffs contracted with the defendants for participation in a vacation travel package to the Caribbean island of
Guadaloupe. 7 The defendants' promotional literature had offered
the vacationers a choice between relatively primitive accommodations and luxury accommodations equipped with air conditioning,
private bathrooms, and electricity.8 The plaintiffs chose the accommodations with the luxury features. Upon arriving at the resort,
however, they found that the facilities failed to conform to the explicit representations in the promotional brochure.9 The plaintiffs
subsequently brought an action, alleging breach of contract and
fraudulent misrepresentations in the marketing of the vacation
travel package,' 0 and moved for class certification." The Supreme
Court, New York County, granted the plaintiffs' motion, and the
12
defendants appealed.
The Appellate Division, First Department, rejected the defention who had relied on the defendants' representations concerning a Jamaican resort. Id. at
698, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 784. The court asserted that class certification should depend upon
"'whether the group is more bound together by a mutual interest in the settlement of common questions than it is divided'" by individual questions. Id. at 699, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 785
(quoting 2 WK&M 1 901.08, at 9-31). Noting, therefore, that the case involved a "cohesive
and finite group of.similarly situated vacationers, who relied upon essentially identical representations in advertising matter," the court granted class certification. 89 Misc. 2d at 699,
392 N.Y.S.2d at 785. See also Dupack v. Nationwide Leisure Corp., 70 App. Div. 2d 568, 417
N.Y.S.2d 63 (1st Dep't 1979).
5 76 App. Div. 2d 123, 430 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1st Dep't 1980).
8 Id. at 125, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
Id. at 124, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
8 Id. at 124, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
9 Id. at 125, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 66. The plaintiffs alleged that an extended drought at the
resort site had caused the hotel to suffer from a sporadic supply of electricity, no air conditioning, intermittent running water, and unsatisfactory sanitary facilities. Id. at 129, 430
N.Y.S.2d at 68 (Murphy, P.J., dissenting). Furthermore, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants knew of these conditions before the departure of the tour, but failed to inform the
members of the tour. Id. at 125, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
'0 Id. at 124, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 65. Alleging a conspiracy to defraud, breach of contract,
and fraud, the plaintiffs sought to recover actual and punitive damages or, in the alternative, rescission and refund of monies they had paid to the defendants. Id.
1 Id. The proposed class was limited to persons choosing the accommodations at the
hotel for the last week of July 1977. Id.
12Id. at 123, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
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dants' contention that class certification was inappropriate in
fraud actions, and affirmed the order granting the plaintiffs' motion for certification. 13 Writing for a divided court,14 Justice Sandler noted that fraud actions were not "generically unsuitable" for
class certification under CPLR article 9.15 Rather, the court stated,
class certification of an action sounding in fraud should depend
upon satisfaction of the prerequisites enumerated in the statute.1 "
The court asserted that the presence of "subsidiary questions...
not common to the class" did not prevent compliance with the requirement of section 901 that common issues of law or fact
predominate over individual issues.'7 Justice Sandler then determined that reliance generally was a subsidiary question in fraud
actions, and that a substantial issue of reliance was not likely to
arise once a material misrepresentation had been established.18
3 Id. at 128, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
" Justices Kupferman and Lynch joined in Justice Sandler's majority opinion. Presiding Justice Murphy filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Lupiano concurred.
15 76 App. Div. 2d at 125, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 66. Justice Sandler acknowledged that prior
to the enactment of CPLR article 9, the general rule had been that a class action would not
lie for fraud. Id. Citing the legislative history of article 9, however, the majority concluded
that the primary thrust of the statute was to provide a more "flexible and functional approach" to class actions. Id. at 126, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 66; see note 27 infra. Moreover, Justice
Sandler asserted that the commentators were "uniform" in their belief that the class action
device was available where "a single fraud has harmed a large number." Id. at 126-27, 430
N.Y.S.2d at 67 (citing CPLR 901, commentary at 325 (1976); SIEGEL § 141, at 179; 2 WK&M
1 901.08).
"' 76 App. Div. 2d at 125, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
17 Id. at 126, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
Is Id. at 127, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 67. In concluding that subsidiary questions of reliance did
not preclude class certification of the King plaintiffs' claims, the court distinguished the
decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Strauss v. Long Island Sports,
Inc., 60 App. Div. 2d 501, 401 N.Y.S.2d 233 (2d Dep't 1978). In Strauss, the plaintiff purported to represent a class comprised of all purchasers of season tickets to the defendant
basketball team's games. Id. at 505, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 235. Prior to the opening of the season,
the defendant sold the team's star player. Id. at 504, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 234. The plaintiff
alleged that all the purchasers had bought their tickets in reliance on materially misleading
advertising to the effect that the team's star would remain on the team. Id. The Second
Department denied the motion for class certification on the ground that the possible motives for the purchase of season tickets were too varied to permit an inference that all the
purchases were made in reliance on the advertisement. Id. at 507, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 236. The
King court, in contrast, observed that "it is not plausible that persons confronted with the
very distinct choice in the character of facilities . . . would have opted to spend a July
vacation on a tropical island in a 'luxury' hotel with air conditioning, private bathroom and
electricity, without having 'relied' on those representations." 76 App. Div. 2d at 127, 430
N.Y.S.2d at 67. Moreover, the majority observed that generally no "substantial" issue of
reliance remains in a fraud action once a material misrepresentation has been shown. Id.
Indeed, Justice Sandler postulated that the individual questions of reliance would
predominate over the common issues only in the "exceptional fraud action" where it is al-
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Therefore, the court concluded that, on the facts presented, the
common issues predominated over the individual question of
reliance.19
Dissenting, Justice Murphy argued that the issues common to
the class did not predominate over the individual question of reliance. 20 Instead, the dissent characterized reliance as a "critical element" in every fraud action.2 Because the issue of reliance is
"highly subjective,"22 the dissent urged that the trier of fact would
have to consider the question of reliance separately with respect to
each member of the class.2 Thus, Justice Murphy concluded that
the issue of reliance predominated, and that class certification was,
therefore, inappropriate. 4
The King court's conclusion that fraud actions are not generically unsuitable for class certification 25 should provide for greater
flexibility in the application of CPLR article 9 to consumer ac2
tions,26 thus furthering the legislative purpose of article 9. 7
leged that the plaintiffs have made a separate investigation of the facts or had access to
relevant information. Id.; see W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 108.
76 App. Div. 2d at 127-28, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
Id. at 129, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 69 (Murphy, P.J., dissenting).
21 Id. (Murphy, P.J., dissenting).
22 Id. (Murphy, P.J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 130, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 69 (Murphy, P.J., dissenting).
24 Id. (Murphy, P.J., dissenting). Justice Murphy also expressed doubts as to whether
the other requirements of section 901(a) had been met. He stated that the claims by plaintiffs were not typical of claims that other members of the class might make; rather, a trier of
fact would have to consider the particular facts upon which each individual relied. Id. Nor
did Justice Murphy believe that the plaintiffs could adequately protect the interests of the
class, as they did not know and could not prove the facts upon which they based their
reliance. Id. In Justice Murphy's view, the necessity that the trier of fact in a fraud action
address itself to the merits of each claim made class action impractical; therefore, a class
action was not "superior to other available methods" for the adjudication of actions sounding in fraud. Id.
2 See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
26 See Dickerson, Class Actions Under Article 9 of CPLR, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 18, 1980, at 1,
col. 1.
217See THIRTEENTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1975), in
TWENTY-FIRST ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 232 (1976). In recommending the enactment of CPLR article 9, the judicial conference stated that the "privity" requirement of
former CPLR 1005, see note 4 supra, effectively prevented class action certification in cases
involving "typically modern claims [such] as those associated with mass exposure to environmental offenses, violations of consumer rights . . . and a multitude of other collective
activities reaching virtually every phase of human life." THIRTEENTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD.
CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1975), in TWENTY-FIRST ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 232,
248 (1976). Perceiving a need for a less rigid approach to class certification in these areas,
the conference recommended the repeal of CPLR 1005 and the substitution of the present
article 9. Id. at 250; see Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 207, N.Y. Laws (June
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Clearly, use of the class action vehicle in fraud cases will permit
the maintenance of consumer fraud actions which would be economically infeasible if pursued individually. 28 It must be recognized, however, that the holding in King was based upon the
court's narrower determination that the facts and circumstances of
the case supported an inference of reliance. 29 It is suggested, therefore, that rather than relying on the King court's broad generalization that a substantial issue of reliance is unlikely to arise, the
courts should consider carefully the facts and circumstances of
each case to determine if such an inference of reliance is

supportable.30
It is further submitted that after a determination in favor of
class certification has been made, the court must remain sensitive
to the possibility that evidence may emerge during the course of
the proceedings which tends to rebut the inference of reliance.3 1 In
such event, CPLR 907 provides guidelines for the court to follow in
its conduct of the proceedings. 2 Under section 907, the court may
decertify the class if necessary to ensure the fair conduct of the
action.3 3 Alternatively, the proceedings can be bifurcated, pursuant
17, 1975), reprinted in [1975] N.Y. Laws 1748 (McKinney).
11 See Guadagno v. Diamond Tours & Travel, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d 697, 698, 392 N.Y.S.2d
783, 784 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976); Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal
Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 639 (1971).
2" See 76 App. Div. 2d at 127-28, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 67. Although all of the elements of a
cause of action sounding in fraud generally must be proven, Dhooge Bros., Inc. v. Mecho, 15
App. Div. 2d 774, 774, 224 N.Y.S.2d 745, 746 (1st Dep't 1962) (per curiam); Vom Lehn v.
Astor Art Galleries, Ltd., 86 Misc. 2d 1, 9, 380 N.Y.S.2d 532, 540 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County
1976); Taylor v. Heisinger, 39 Misc. 2d 955, 959, 242 N.Y.S.2d 281, 284 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1963); Tani v. Luddy, 32 Misc. 2d 53, 56, 221 N.Y.S.2d 314, 319 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1961), reliance may be inferred under the proper circumstances. See, e.g., Ochs
v. Woods, 221 N.Y. 335, 338, 117 N.E. 305, 306 (1917); Taylor v. Guest, 58 N.Y. 262, 266
(1874); Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc., 60 App. Div. 2d 501, 508, 401 N.Y.S.2d 233, 236
(2d Dep't 1978) (dictum); Gaudagno v. Diamond Tours & Travel, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d 697, 699,
392 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1976).
20 See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
-" While the plaintiff's case may be established by circumstantial evidence, see Ochs v.
Woods, 221 N.Y. 335, 338, 117 N.E.2d 305, 306 (1917); Taylor v. Guest, 58 N.Y. 262, 266
(1874); Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc., 60 App. Div. 2d 501, 508, 401 N.Y.S.2d 233, 236
(2d Dep't 1978) (dictum), the inference drawn is not conclusive and may be rebutted. See
generally W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE §§ 56-58 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973).
"2CPLR 907 (1976). See generally The Survey, 50 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 189 (1975).
- 2 WK&M 901.08, at 9-34. CPLR 907 gives the court power to "make appropriate
orders" for the conduct of the action which may have the effect of amending the original
order granting class certification. CPLR 907 (1976); see 2 WK&M 1 902.03, at 9-51. The
order permitting class action, pursuant to CPLR 902, is not immutable, and may be altered
at any time prior to decision on the merits, CPLR 902 (1976). If the court finds that class
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to CPLR 906, and the issue of reliance tried separately from the
questions which are common to the class. 3 4 The remedies provided
by CPLR 906 and 907, therefore, would seem to provide adequate
safeguards for the rights of individual parties to a fraud action
when it appears that the court has improvidently granted class certification. Accordingly, the holding in King, coupled with these
safeguards, should facilitate the vindication of the rights of defrauded consumers without compromising the rights of the individual parties, whether defendants or unnamed plaintiffs.3 5
Robert C. Wilkie
action is not appropriate, the action may be allowed to proceed as the individual claim of
the named plaintiff. 2 WK&M 902.03, at 9-51; cf. Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422
F. Supp. 526, 530 (W.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1978) (rule 23(c)(1) of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits court to decertify class if later events indicate
class action inappropriate); Fox v. Prudent Resources Trust, 69 F.R.D. 74, 77 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (rule 23(c)(1) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows court to reverse decision
allowing class action).
34 CPLR 906 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
1. an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or
2. a class may be divided into subclasses-and each subclass treated as a class.
Id.; see Simon v. Cunard Line Ltd., 75 App. Div. 2d 283, 288-89, 428 N.Y.S.2d 952, 955 (1st
Dep't 1980). But see CPLR 901, commentary at 28 (Supp. 1980-1981); Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc., 60 App. Div. 2d 501, 401 N.Y.S.2d 233 (2d Dep't 1978). In Strauss, the
court questioned the practicality of separating the common questions from the question of
reliance in a fraud action. The court urged that where reliance would not be substantially
established by the proofs on the issue of liability, bifurcation of the reliance question would
cause the class action to degenerate into separate trials on the issue of reliance. Id. at 507,
401 N.Y.S.2d at 235. Therefore, contrary to the aims of CPLR 906, judicial economy would
not be served. Id.; cf. Tucker v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 477-78 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (bifurcation approach criticized as not resolving the conflict between the necessity of
establishing reliance in a fraud action and the requirement under rule 23 of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that common issues predominate over individual questions).
35 If, at some time after the proceedings commence, it develops that the defendant can
rebut the inference of reliance with respect to individual members of the class, the class may
be subdivided to remove those members, CPLR 906, commentary at 345 (1976), or the court
may separate the issues and allow the class action to proceed with respect to the common
issues, see note 34 and accompanying text supra, or if rebuttal evidence is presented with
respect to so many members of the class that the action becomes unmanageable, the court
may decertify the class. 2 WK&M 901.08, at 9-34.
While most commentators have focused on the class action as a device for vindicating
the rights of the plaintiffs, see, e.g., Dickerson, note 26 supra, it is important to remember
that the rights of the unnamed plaintiffs are jeopardized when class certification is granted.
A judgment for the defendant will be binding on them as well as on the plaintiffs who are
actually bringing the action. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 86 (1942); Farrell, Civil Practice,
27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 425, 429 (1976); see Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422 F. Supp.
526, 533 (W.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1978); Levitt v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Cos., 44 App. Div. 2d 558, 558-59, 352 N.Y.S.2d 677, 678 (2d Dep't 1974); 2 WK&M 1 901.10,
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ARTICLE 31-DIsCLOSURE

CPLR 3117(a) (2): Use of party's deposition by adversely interested party subject to trial court's discretionary power to control
proceedings
CPLR 3117(a)(2) authorizes the use of a party's deposition by
an adverse party "for any purpose." 6 Pursuant to this provision, a
deposition may be admitted into evidence for impeachment purposes or as evidence in chief3 7 notwithstanding that the deponent
is available to testify as a witness.3 8 Nevertheless, it had never
been expressly determined whether a trial court, in the exercise of
at 9-36. Therefore, if it appears that the defendant will be able to establish nonreliance by
the named plaintiff on the alleged misrepresentations, the court may find it necessary to
decertify the class to preserve the rights of members of the class who are not before it.
31CPLR 3117(a)(2) (Supp. 1980-1981) provides:
At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any
part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be
used in accordance with any of the following provisions:
(2) the deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the
deposition was an officer, director, member, or managing or authorized agent of a
party, or the deposition of an employee of a party produced by that party, may be
used for any purpose by any adversely interested party ....
CPLR 3117(a) was adapted in part from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FMRsT REP.
146, and is virtually identical to rule 32(a)(2) of the federal rules. See generally 4A J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 32.01 (2d ed. 1980).
'7 See United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 263, 360
N.E.2d 943, 951, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 273 (1976); Spampinato v. A.B.C. Consol. Corp., 35
N.Y.2d 283, 286-87, 319 N.E.2d 196, 198, 360 N.Y.S.2d 878, 880 (1974); Gonzalez v. Medina,
69 App. Div. 2d 14, 21-22, 417 N.Y.S.2d 953, 958 (lst Dep't 1979); In re Estate of Schaich,
55 App. Div. 2d 914, 914, 391 N.Y.S.2d 135, 136 (2d Dep't 1977); Rodford v. Sample, 30
App. Div. 2d 588, 588, 290 N.Y.S.2d 30, 32 (3d Dep't 1968); CPLR 3117, commentary at 491
(1970); 3A WK&M 1 3117.04. It has been noted that CPLR 3117(a)(2) was intended "to
authorize the use of a party's deposition unlimitedly against the deponent." SIXTH REP. 318.
38 See Spampinato v. A.B.C. Consol. Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 283, 285, 319 N.E.2d 196, 198,
360 N.Y.S.2d 878, 880 (1974); Perkins v. New York Racing Ass'n, 51 App. Div. 2d 585, 586,
378 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (2d Dep't 1976); General Ceramics Co. v. Schenley Products Co., 262
App. Div. 528, 529, 30 N.Y.S.2d 540, 541 (1st Dep't 1941); cf. Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d
1036, 1046 (7th Cir. 1974); Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 333, 338 (3d
Cir. 1974); Pingatore v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 419 F.2d 1138, 1142 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970); Community Counselling Serv., Inc. v. Reilly, 317 F.2d 239, 243
(4th Cir. 1963); Pursche v. Atlas Scraper & Eng'r Co., 300 F.2d 467, 488-89 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962) (federal rule 32(a)(2) allows introduction of party's deposition notwithstanding his prior testimony or unavailability). Notably, however, if the deponent is a nonparty witness his deposition may not be used as evidence in chief, unless one of
the unavailability requirements enumerated in CPLR 3117(a)(3) is satisfied. 3A WK&M 1
3117.04. See Wojtas v. Fifth Ave. Coach Corp., 23 App. Div. 2d 685, 685, 257 N.Y.S.2d 404,
405 (2d Dep't 1965).

